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ABSTRACT
CLEVER (Cross-Lipschitz Extreme Value for nEtwork Ro-
bustness) is an Extreme Value Theory (EVT) based robust-
ness score for large-scale deep neural networks (DNNs). In
this paper, we propose two extensions on this robustness
score. First, we provide a new formal robustness guarantee
for classifier functions that are twice differentiable. We apply
extreme value theory on the new formal robustness guarantee
and the estimated robustness is called second-order CLEVER
score. Second, we discuss how to handle gradient mask-
ing, a common defensive technique, using CLEVER with
Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA). With
BPDA applied, CLEVER can evaluate the intrinsic robust-
ness of neural networks of a broader class – networks with
non-differentiable input transformations. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of CLEVER with BPDA in experiments on a
121-layer Densenet model trained on the ImageNet dataset.
Index Terms— Adversarial Examples, Deep Learning,
Robustness Evaluation
1. INTRODUCTION
It is well-known that deep neural networks (DNNs) are vul-
nerable to adversarial examples, and a small perturbation
added to the input can mislead the network to classify in any
desired class. There has been significant efforts developing
verification techniques to prove that no adversarial perturba-
tion δ exists if ‖δ‖p ≤ r given an input x0 and a classifier
function f . However, the verification problem is hard and
generally intractable because a general neural network classi-
fier is highly non-convex and non-smooth.
Alternatively, instead of verifying the exact robustness r,
one idea is to provide a lower bound of r, which guarantees
that no adversarial examples exist within an ℓp ball of radius
ǫ. We call ǫ the robustness lower bound of the input image x0
on classifier function f . CLEVER (Cross-Lipschitz Extreme
Value for nEtwork Robustness) [1] is the first attack-agnostic
robustness score to estimate the robustness lower bound ǫ for
∗Equally contributed. Codes: https://github.com/huanzhang12/CLEVER.
large-scale DNNs, e.g. modern ImageNet networks such as
ResNet, Inception, etc. It is based on a theoretical analysis
of formal robustness guarantee with Lipschitz continuity as-
sumption. The authors of [1] propose a sampling based ap-
proach with Extreme Value Theory to estimate the local Lip-
schitz constant, and empirically, this estimation aligns well
with other robustness evaluation metrics, for example, the dis-
tortion of adversarial perturbation found by strong attacks.
In this work, we provide two extensions of CLEVER.
First, we derive a new robustness guarantee for classifier func-
tions that are twice differentiable, and we estimate the theo-
retical bounds via extreme value theory. Second, we extend
CLEVER to be capable of evaluating the robustness of net-
works with non-differentiable input transformations, making
it available for a wider class of neural networks deployed with
gradient masking based defense.
2. RELATED WORK
Evaluating the robustness of a neural network can be done
by crafting adversarial examples with a specific attack algo-
rithm [2, 3, 4, 5]. However, this methodology has a major
drawback as the resilience of a network to existing attacks is
not guaranteed to be extended to subsequent attacks. In fact,
many defensive methods have been shown either partially or
completely broken after stronger and adaptive attacks are pro-
posed [6, 7, 8, 9]. Thus, it is of great importance to provide
an attack-agnostic robustness evaluation metric.
On the other hand, existing formal verification methods
that solves the exact minimum adversarial distortion r (which
is independent of attack algorithm) are quite expensive – ver-
ifying a small network with only a few hundred neurons on
one input example can take a few hours [10], and in fact, even
finding a non-trivial lower bound for r can be hard, and so
far only results on CIFAR and MNIST networks are avail-
able [11, 12]. [1] presents a framework to estimate local Lip-
schitz constant using extreme value theory, and then obtain an
attack-agnostic robustness score (CLEVER) based on first-
order Lipschitz continuity condition. CLEVER can scale to
ImageNet networks.
Recently, Goodfellow [13] raises concerns on CLEVER
in the case of networks with gradient masking, a defensive
technique that obfuscates model gradients to prevent gradi-
ent based attacks. One of the main objective of this work is
to show that such concerns can be safely eliminated with the
BPDA technique proposed in [6]. Moreover, we also exper-
imentally show how CLEVER can successfully handle net-
works with non-differentiable input transformations, includ-
ing the stair-case function example in [13].
3. EXTENDING CLEVER WITH SECOND ORDER
APPROXIMATION
3.1. Background and definitions
Let x0 ∈ R
d be the input of a K-class classifier f : Rd →
R
K , the predicted class ofx0 is c(x0) = argmax1≤i≤K fi(x0).
Given x0 and c, we say xa := x0+δ is an adversarial exam-
ple if there exists a δ ∈ Rd makes c(xa) 6= c(x0) while ‖δ‖p
is small. A successful untargeted attack is to find a xa such
that c(xa) 6= c(x0) while a successful targeted attack is to
find a xa such that c(xa) = t given a target class t 6= c(x0).
On the other hand, the definition of norm-bounded robustness
ǫ is the following: given a target class t, ǫ is the targeted
robustness of x0, if
gt(x0 + δ) ≥ 0, ∀ ‖δ‖p ≤ ǫ, (1)
where gt(x) := fc(x)− ft(x). Similarly, ǫ is the untargeted
robustness if (1) holds for all classes t 6= c(x0).
3.2. Robustness for continuously differentiable classifiers
In [1], the authors have shown that if the classifier function
f has continuously differentiable components fi, the targeted
robustness is
ǫ = min(
gt(x0)
Ltq
, R), (2)
whereLtq is the local Lipschitz constant for the function gt(x)
within a local region x ∈ Bp(x0, R) and 1/p+1/q = 1, 1,≤
p, q ≤ ∞. A simple proof of this guarantee is based on the
mean value theorem on the first order expansion of gt(x0+δ):
∃s ∈ [0, 1], gt(x0 + δ) = gt(x0) +∇gt(x0 + sδ)
⊤
δ. (3)
With Ho¨lder’s inequality,
gt(x0 + δ) = gt(x0) +∇gt(x0 + sδ)
⊤
δ
≥ gt(x0)− ‖∇gt(x0 + sδ)‖q‖δ‖p
≥ gt(x0)− max
x∈Bp(x0,R)
‖∇gt(x)‖q · ‖δ‖p
= gt(x0)− L
t
q · ‖δ‖p.
Thus, the targeted robustness bound (2) is obtained by re-
quiring the lower bound of gt(x0 + δ) to be non-negative.
The authors of [1] further extend their analysis to neural net-
works with ReLU activations, which is a special case of non-
differentiable functions.
3.3. Robustness for twice differentiable classifiers
In this work, we provide formal robustness guarantees when
classifier functions f are twice differentiable – for example,
neural networks with twice differentiable activations such as
tanh, sigmoid, softplus, etc. For a twice-differentiable func-
tion gt(x) := fc(x)− ft(x), there exists s ∈ [0, 1] such that
gt(x0+δ) = gt(x0)+∇gt(x0)
⊤
δ+
1
2
δ
⊤
H(x0+sδ)δ, (4)
whereH(x0 + sδ) is the Hessian of gt at x0 + sδ. This is
analogous to the Mean Value Theorem in the first order case,
but extended with a second order term. This expansion of
gt(x0 + δ) can be used to derive the targeted robustness of
x0 in the following Theorem:
Theorem 3.1 (Formal robustness guarantee). Given an input
x0 and a K-class classifier f , the targeted robustness of x0
is
ǫ = min(
−b+
√
b2 + 2aγ
a
,R) (5)
where a = max
x∈Bp(x0,R) ‖H(x)‖p,q, b = ‖∇gt(x0)‖p,
and γ = gt(x0).
Proof. By holder’s inequality and the definition of induced
norm, we have
|∇gt(x0)
⊤
δ| ≤ ‖∇gt(x0)‖q‖δ‖p
and
|δ⊤H(x0 + sδ)δ| ≤ ‖H(x0 + sδ)δ‖q‖δ‖p
≤ ‖H(x0 + sδ)‖p,q‖δ‖p‖δ‖p
≤ max
x∈Bp(x0,R)
‖H(x)‖p,q‖δ‖
2
p.
Let a = max
x∈Bp(x0,R) ‖H(x)‖p,q, b = ‖∇gt(x0)‖p, and
γ = gt(x0), we get a lower bound of gt(x0 + δ):
gt(x0 + δ) = gt(x0) +∇gt(x0)
⊤
δ +
1
2
δ
⊤
H(x0 + sδ)δ
≥ gt(x0)− b‖δ‖p −
1
2
a‖δ‖2p. (6)
If we can guarantee (6) ≥ 0, then we can guarantee gt(x0 +
δ) ≥ 0, which is the definition of targetted robustness in (1).
Thus, the condition of (6) ≥ 0 gives
‖δ‖p ≤
−b+
√
b2 + 2aγ
a
.
3.4. Sampling via Extreme Value Theory
Theorem3.1 needs the value a := max
x∈Bp(x0,R) ‖H(x)‖p,q,
which is the maximum subordinate norm of the Hessian ma-
trix within x ∈ Bp(x0, R). When p = q = 2, it becomes the
well-known spectral norm, and can be evaluated efficiently
on a single point x using power iteration or Lanczos method.
Under the framework of CLEVER, we apply extreme value
theory to estimate a by sampling differentx ∈ Bp(x0, R) and
running power iterations on each sampled point. In this pa-
per, we focus on the case of p = q = 2 only (ℓ2 robustness).
After we get an estimate of a, a second order robustness
lower bound can be estimated at point x0 using (5). The
estimated bound of (2) is named 1st-order CLEVER while
the estimated bound of (5) is called 2nd-order CLEVER.
4. CLEVER WITH GRADIENT MASKING BASED
DEFENSE
4.1. Gradient Masking
Gradient masking [14] is a popular defending method against
adversarial examples where the model does not provide useful
gradients for generating adversarial examples. Typical gra-
dient masking techniques include adding non-differentiable
layers [15] (bit-depth reduction, JPEG compression, etc) to
the network, numerically making the gradient vanish (De-
fensive Distillation [16]), and modifying the optimization
landscape of the loss function in a local region [14] of each
data point. These methods typically prevent gradient-based
adversarial attacks by providing non-informative gradients.
However, many of the gradient masking techniques have been
shown ineffective as a defense. Notably, Defensive Distilla-
tion can be bypassed by attacking the logit (unnormalized
probability) layer values to avoid the saturated softmax func-
tions; many non-differentiable transformation functions can
be bypassed using the Backward Pass Differentiable Approx-
imation (BPDA) [6]; the modifications in local landscape of
the loss function can be escaped by adding a small random
noise when performing the attack [14].
When CLEVER is evaluated, we always use the logit
layer values, thus we are not subject to the saturation of the
sigmoid units. Additionally, during the sampling processes,
we evaluate gradients using a large number of randomly per-
turbed images, thus CLEVER is likely to escape the region of
masked gradients in local loss landscape. The remaining con-
cern is thus whether CLEVER can be evaluated on networks
with a non-differentiable layer as a defense. For example, if
the input image is quantized via bit-depth reduction, a stair-
case function is applied to the network and thus its gradient
cannot be computed via automatic differentiation. We will
formally discuss this situation in the next section.
4.2. Apply Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation
(BPDA) to CLEVER
For a neural network classifier f(x), we can apply a non-
differentiable transformation h(x) to the input x and then
feed the data after transformation into f . The function
f(h(x)) thus becomes non-differentiable, and gradient based
adversarial attacks fail to find successful adversarial exam-
ples. An example of h(x) is a staircase function, as suggested
in [13]. This transformation also hinders the direct use of
CLEVER to evaluate the robustness of f(h(x)).
To handle non-differentiable transformations, we use the
Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA) [6]
technique. The intuition behind BPDA is that although h(x0)
is non-differentiable (e.g., bit-depth reduction, JPEG com-
pression, etc), it usually holds that h(x0) ≈ x0. Thus, in
backpropagation, we can assume that
∇xf(h(x))|x=x0 ≈ ∇xf(x)|x=h(x0) . (7)
To evaluate CLEVER for a network with an input trans-
formation h (for example, a staircase function), x is sampled
within an ℓp ball around x0. Then, a transformation h(x0)
is applied, such that xˆ = h(x). Then, the backpropagation
procedure computes∇xˆf(xˆ). We simply collect ∇xˆf(xˆ) as
the gradient, and compute its norm as a sample for Lipschitz
constant estimation.
4.3. CLEVER is a White-Box Evaluation Tool
CLEVER is intended to be a tool for network designers
and to evaluate network robustness in the “white-box” set-
ting in which we know how a (defended) neural network
processes the input. In this case, we can deal with the non-
differentiable transformation h with BPDA, and evaluate the
intrinsic robustness of the model, without the “False Sense of
Security [6]” provided by gradient masking.
In black-box attack setting, the gradient of f(h(x))
must be evaluated via finite differences [17], thus a non-
differentiable g(x) prevents gradient based attacks in black-
box settings because the estimated gradient becomes infinite
(i.e., the value of f(g(x)) is unlikely to change when x is
changed by a small amount). Goodfellow [13] raises con-
cerns on the effectiveness of CLEVER in this setting, but
this setting is different from our intended usage of CLEVER.
Most importantly, CLEVER computes gradients using back-
propagation via automatic differentiation in the white-box
setting, rather than using finite differences. Despite the lim-
ited numerical precision on digital computers, CLEVER is
not subject to the same numerical issues as in the black-box
attack setting. Unless backpropagation fails, CLEVER is
able to estimate a reasonable robustness score reflecting the
intrinsic model robustness.
5. EXPERIMENTS
5.1. Experiments on 1st Order and 2nd Order Bounds
We compute the targeted robustness bounds for a 7-layer
CNN model with tanh activations (which is twice differen-
tiable) on CIFAR dataset with a validation accuracy of 72.6%.
We calculated both Eq. (2) and (5) via sampling with extreme
Table 1. Comparison of 1st order and 2nd order ℓ2 CLEVER
with least-likely target labels on a 7-layer tanh CIFAR CNN.
The average distortion found by CW-ℓ2 attack is 0.310.
Least-likely Target 1st order 2nd order
avg ℓ2 CLEVER 0.057 0.051
% of images with larger score 54 46
avg % of increase on the score 47% 44%
Table 2. Comparison of 1st order and 2nd order ℓ2 CLEVER
with runner-up target labels on a 7-layer tanh CIFAR CNN.
The average distortion found by CW-ℓ2 attack is 0.101.
Runner-up Target 1st order 2nd order
avg ℓ2 CLEVER 0.024 0.026
% of images with larger score 18 82
avg % of increase on the score 77% 58%
value theory, and we denote the estimated scores as “1st or-
der” and “2nd order” CLEVER scores respectively in the
Tables. In particular, we follow the sampling procedure pro-
posed in [1] to estimate the Lipschitz constant by fitting the
samples with maximum likelihood estimation on Reversed
Weibull distribution and calculate the estimated robustness
scores of (2). For the “2nd order” bound (5), we also use
sampling and extreme value theory to calculate the estimated
bounds, as describe in Section 3.4. For fair comparison, we
use the same number of samples (Nb = 100 and Ns = 200)
for both estimated bounds and we compare their average as
well as the percentage of image examples that the score is
larger than the other. For each image, we select three attack
target classes: least likely, random and runner-up. The results
are summarized in Tables 1, 2 and 3. We observe that the
1st order and 2nd order average CLEVER scores usually stay
close, indicating that both scores agree with each other.
Since CLEVER is a score of estimated lower bound, we
desire the score is not trivially small, but smaller than the up-
per bound found by adversarial attacks (in our case the CW
ℓ2 attack). As shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3, all CLEVER scores
are less then CW ℓ2 distortion. Second order CLEVER can
sometimes give a better result than its first order counterpart,
indicating that second order approximation is probably more
accurate for these examples. The “avg. % of increase on the
score” rows in tables report the improvement of score when
one method is better than the other; for example, in runner-up
target, second order CLEVER increases the score for 82% of
the examples, and the average improvement of score compar-
ing to first order CLEVER is 58%.
5.2. Experiments on Networks with Input Transforma-
tion as a Gradient Masking based Defense
We conduct experiments on a 121-layer DenseNet [18] net-
work pretrained on ImageNet dataset1. We employ two
1model available at https://github.com/pudae/tensorflow-densenet
Table 3. Comparison of 1st order and 2nd order ℓ2 CLEVER
with random target labels on a 7-layer tanh CIFAR CNN. The
average distortion found by CW-ℓ2 attack is 0.264.
Random Target 1st order 2nd order
avg ℓ2 CLEVER 0.049 0.036
% of images with larger score 76 24
avg % of increase on the score 55% 68%
Table 4. ℓ2 robustness CLEVER scores with and without in-
put transformations on a 121-layer Densenet model, for three
different target classes. The average adversarial distortion of
CW ℓ2 attack for the same set of images are 0.2058, 0.52788
and 0.66114, for runner-up, random and least-likely target
classes, respectively.
Target Class Runner-up Random Least Lilely
No transformation 0.14229 0.35632 0.44725
Bit-depth reduction 0.10223 0.26224 0.34722
JPEG compression 0.11539 0.27804 0.36275
non-differentiable input transfomrations that mask gradients:
bit-depth reduction (reducing each color channel from 8-bit
to 3-bit, setting all lower bits to 0) and JPEG compression
(quality set to 75%). We compute ℓ2 CLEVER (first order)
scores for the network with and without input transforma-
tions, with CLEVER parameter Nb = 200 and Ns = 1024.
We randomly choose 100 images from the ImageNet valida-
tion set, and select three attack target classes for each image
(least likely, random and runner-up). Misclassified images
are skipped.
Table 5.2 compares the ℓ2 CLEVER scores for three target
classes, for the original model, and for bit-depth reduction or
JPEG compression as input transformations. BPDA is used to
compute CLEVER when an input transformation is applied.
Not surprisingly, the CLEVER scores for networks with input
transformation as a gradient masking method do not notice-
ably increase, indicating that these transformations do not in-
crease the model’s intrinsic robustness; in other words, with
BPDA applied, we can still obtain similar gradients as the
original model, thus it is expected that CLEVER scores do
not change too much in this situation.
6. CONCLUSIONS
CLEVER [1] is a first-order approximation based robustness
score. We move one step further to give a second order formal
guarantee for DNN robustness. We show that it improves the
estimated robustness lower bound for some examples, and in
many cases both first and second order CLEVER scores are
coherent. Additionally, we successfully apply Backward Pass
Differentiable Approximation (BPDA) to compute CLEVER
scores for a network with non-differentiable input transfor-
mations, including staircase functions. Our discussions and
results remedy the concerns raised in [13].
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